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Abstract: This article suggests that Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive theory of pure forgiveness of 
the unforgivable is a persuasive philosophical concept that nonetheless breaks down at the moment 
when it enters into a political discourse. Tracing two conflicting strains within Derrida’s theory–the 
deconstructive rejection of ideas’ degrading circulation and the unabashed endorsement of Nelson 
Mandela’s engagement of the ideals of democracy and justice–this immanent critique will point to 
possibilities for Derrida’s theory of forgiveness to have political relevance. It begins with an exploration 
of the philosopher’s theory of pure forgiveness as an aporia of the impossible forgiveness of unforgivable 
crimes. It then reveals tensions between Derrida’s deconstructive resistance to what he sees as the 
economic exchange of forgiveness and his uncritical endorsement of Mandela’s political use of the ideals of 
justice, freedom, and equality. This critique hopes to allow for new engagements with Derrida’s thought 
that will allow political and critical theory to address forgiveness as an important factor in postconflict 
politics and everyday life.
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Although Jacques Derrida’s aporia of pure forgiveness is consistent within his deconstructive 
framework, his admiration of Nelson Mandela’s morality both shows a discord between 
exceptional forgiveness and universal justice, and exemplifies what Derrida elsewhere sees as 
the corruption of the deconstructive concept by the political. The concept of pure forgiveness, 
however, resonates with the seemingly impossible release of negative emotions surrounding 
severe trauma that survivors of genocide describe in postconflict Rwanda. While I acknowledge 
that Derrida is not an explicitly political thinker and that his writings about politics more closely 
resemble an aesthetic or literary reading than an engagement with policy, I offer this critique as an 
opening in Derrida’s vacillation for applications of pure forgiveness to postconflict political theory.
Something resembling pure or impossible forgiveness is not only possible but has 
been attained after horrific violence in places like Rwanda. Derrida senses the tension 
between the philosophical imperative to define pure forgiveness and the pragmatic need 
for political reconciliation. His answer to this tension is to point to the need for laws based 
on ethics of pure forgiveness. This imprecise answer gives little to the political pragmatist 
other than critical legal theory or legal reform informed by Derridian pure forgiveness and its 
contrastxwithxreconciliation. 
Derrida’s Aporia of Forgiveness
Developed mainly for a seminar on forgiveness he taught in 2001 at New York 
University with Avital Ronell, Derrida’s concept of forgiveness is one of several “aporias,” or 
thought experiments juxtaposing the possible and the impossible that he began exploring late in 
his career.202 As such, his essay “On Forgiveness” posits pure forgiveness as a “madness of the 
impossible” that fits into the broader deconstructive framework.203 He describes forgiveness as 
only possible in forgiving the impossible, meaning that the seemingly impossible task is only 
possible when the crime is so heinous as to be seemingly unforgivable. Moreover, Derrida’s 
pure forgiveness is a powerful concept because it begins to unravel survivors’ difficulties in 
coming to terms with terrible crimes and releasing the offender from resentmentxorxculpability. 
Background: Derrida and Deconstruction
An outcast his whole life as a Sephardic Jew raised in Algeria and marginalized 
under the Vichy colonial system, Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) is best known as the father of 
deconstruction. This critique of Western philosophy attempts to undermine preconceived ideas 
by turning them inside out and by both reversing and destroying their dichotomies. In binaries 
where one idea is dominant (such as male-female or signifier-signified), deconstruction both 
reverses and breaks down the hierarchy. This critique is strongly rooted in language and textual 
content; his concept of différance, the “non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating 
202   Benoit Peeters, Derrida: A Biography (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013) 287. 
203   Jacques Derrida, “On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness,” trans. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes, in On 
         Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London: Routledge, 2001) 39.
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origin of differences,” focuses on the concept of the sign or signifier and the necessity of writing 
to reveal the relativity of meaning.204 Critiques of deconstruction aside (Is it useful? Playful? 
Intellectually wasteful?), Derrida’s attack on moral universalisms provides a compelling 
alternative to all-encompassing philosophical or ethical systems.
Deconstruction’s trope is that it reveals absence to be the new presence, distorting 
philosophical and literary narratives and revealing them to both enclose and destroy dualities. 
Derrida’s essay White Mythology claims that metaphor is a necessary part of philosophy; 
language is itself mere metaphor.205 However, a concept loses its purity when it is inevitably 
circulated in philosophical and everyday discourse. Like knife-grinders who efface coins’ 
markings and thus devalue them, metaphysicians participate in effacement through metaphor, 
whereby the idea is “worn and effaced, polished by the circulation of the philosophical 
concept.”206 The concept of effacement captures deconstruction’s criticism of philosophy 
that overuses universal concepts (from Aristotle and the classical world-builders to Kant 
and the Enlightenment thinkers and Hegel and the historicists). Derrida proposes instead a 
new philosophy that rejects metaphysics’ tropes of presence, telos, truth, and the good—one 
that shows how ideals turn back on themselves and reveal their dualisms. Late in his career, 
Derrida shifts his focus toward ethical and political questions. This “phase of affirmative 
deconstruction” takes on political issues, from September 11th to the death penalty, although 
Derrida’s philosophy was arguably always politically engaged.207 
The Puzzle of Forgiveness
Toward the end of his career, Derrida turns to the aporia, philosophical puzzles that 
present an impasse by being both possible and impossible. These include the impossibilities of 
gifts, hospitality, forgiveness, and mourning. As thought experiments, they use deconstruction 
to find contradictions in philosophical concepts. 
It is in the context of a dialogue with Vladimir Jankélévitch’s work on forgiveness and 
against the backdrop of the Holocaust that Derrida begins his deconstruction of forgiveness. 
The French government had recently eliminated the statute of limitations, l’imprescriptible, on 
crimes against humanity. Jankélévitch’s 1967 philosophical exploration, Le Pardon or Forgiveness, 
covers the Judeo-Christian and philosophical concepts of forgiveness, the power to forgive the 
crimes against forgiveness itself, and the gift of forgiveness as being similar to love.208 However, 
Jankélévitch changes his mind about forgiveness in a chapter of a later book published in 1971, 
L’imprescriptible, arguing against forgiveness of the German people.209 
Derrida traces the shift in Jankélévitch’s argument between these two key texts. Le Pardon 
(1967) claims that forgiveness is possible even for inexpiable crimes: mad forgiveness “forgives 
one time, and this time is literally one time for all!”210 In L’imprescriptible (1971), Jankélévitch retracts 
204   Jacques Derrida, “Différance,” trans. Alan Bass, Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) 11.
205   Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” New Literary History 6.1 (1971): 5–74.
206   Derrida, “White Mythology.”
207   Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac, “Introduction,” Derrida and the Time of the Political, ed. Pheng Cheah and Suzanne 
         Guerlac (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009) 6, 9); A.J.P. Thomson, Deconstruction and Democracy: Derrida’s 
         Politics of Friendship, Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy (London: Contiuum, 2005) 58.
208   Vladimir Jankélévitch, Forgiveness (originally Le Pardon 1967), trans. Andrew Kelley (Chicago: University of Chicago 
         Press, 2005).
209   Vladimir Jankélévitch, “Should We Pardon Them?” (Originally L’imprescriptible 1971) Critical Inquiry 22 (Spring 1996): 553.
210   Jankélévitch, Forgiveness, 154.
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his early exploration of forgiveness in the post-Holocaust case because the Nazi crimes are just 
too monstrous to forgive: “forgiveness is as strong as evil, but evil is as strong as forgiveness.”211 
Jankélévitch’s evolving thought influences Derrida’s emphasis on the sovereign and the problem 
of having a single identity to forgive unconditionally. Derrida explains the seeming contradiction 
between Le Pardon and L’imprescriptible: “pure forgiveness is uncoupled from the institutional 
application of its principles in the same way that Jankélévitch’s work Forgiveness is uncoupled 
from Pardonner? [the relevant chapter in L’imprescriptible].”212 However, Derrida fails to account 
for Jankélévitch’s initial Arendtian assertion in Le Pardon that the moral force of forgiveness lies in 
the fact that it erases the past, effectively causing offenses to no longer have happened. Whereas 
Jankélévitch ultimately finds that the Holocaust makes forgiveness impossible, for Derrida the 
Holocaust simply reaffirms that “[it is] because forgiveness seems to become impossible that 
forgiveness finds a starting point, a new starting point.”213 Here, Derrida differs from Jankélévitch: 
the former expropriates forgiveness to fit into his deconstructive framework, while the latter 
reworks his theory when forgiveness challenges it. 
Jankélévitch criticizes the use of forgiveness after the Holocaust because the perpetrators 
did not repent or ask for forgiveness; in contrast, Derrida criticizes the use of forgiveness after 
political violence because it degrades Abrahamic forgiveness by attempting to fulfill a function 
such as repentance, changing the offender, or preventing a return to previous evil.214 
Late in his career, Derrida argues through the lens of aporia that one can only forgive 
that which is impossible to forgive—mortal or grave crimes such as those committed in 
Germany under the Third Reich. Forgiveness “only becomes possible from the moment that 
it appears impossible. Its history would begin, on the contrary, with the unforgiveable” such 
as the atrocities of Nazi death camps.215 Forgiving the impossible is therefore useful because 
it helps explain how such a seemingly difficult task becomes possible at the darkest moment. 
Derrida thus recognizes forgiveness’s circular and improbable nature, capturing its power to 
heal relationships in the unpredictable postconflict landscape of conflict.
Derrida’s most innovative contributions to thought about forgiveness are the elements 
of unconditionality and nonsovereignty in pure forgiveness. He insists upon a “radical purity” 
and unconditionality of forgiveness (that is, not asking anything of the forgiven, including not 
asking him or her to change). Unconditionality is as crucial to Derrida’s theory of forgiveness 
as it is to his theory of gifts: he claims it impossible for anyone, especially the person forgiving 
(or giving a gift), to state, “I am forgiving; forgiveness has happened” (or “I am giving”). 
Forgiveness defies practical application, and an utterance proclaiming it defies its impossibility 
because the concept is beyond cognitive understanding.216 
Pointing out a discord between unconditional “globalized” Christian forgiveness and 
211   Jankélévitch, “Should We Pardon Them?” 
212   Ethan Kleinberg, “To Atone and to Forgive: Jaspers, Jankélévitch/Derrida, and the Possibility of Forgiveness,” Vladimir 
         Jankélévitch and the Question of Forgiveness, ed. Alan Udoff (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2013) 153. 
213   Richard Kearney, “On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida,” Questioning God, ed. John D. Caputo, 
         Mark Dooley, and Michael J. Scanion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) 54.
214   Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 34.
215   Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 37. 
216   Jacques Derrida, “A Certain Impossibile Possibilty of Saying the Event,” trans. Gila Walker, Late Derrida, eds. W.J.T. 
         Mitchell and Arnold Davidson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007) 232.
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conditional, economically exchanged forgiveness, Derrida draws the important distinction 
between forgiveness and reconciliation, which he defines as a calculation to heal a relationship 
or fix a situation where wrongs have occurred.217 Forgiveness is not only unconditional 
but also divorced from sovereignty. The modern nation-state was born out of violence, 
complicating issues of international human rights with sovereignty or individual power. For 
pure forgiveness, Derrida demands “a forgiveness without power: unconditional but without 
sovereignty.”218 This means taking away the power of the individual to judge and punish in 
order to enable pure and radical forgiveness.
Derrida opposes the use of forgiveness in a normative discourse of mourning and 
reconciliation because doing so risks corrupting pure forgiveness. He insists that the language 
of forgiveness in dialogues of reconciliation prevents pure forgiveness. He argues that the 
entrance of a third party corrupts pure forgiveness and at the moment the victim understands 
the perpetrator as something other than a perpetrator, pure forgiveness gives way to a 
deliberate process of reconciliation. Here, the political (defined as the relationships between 
people as individuals and members of social, political, historical, or economic groups) 
can clarify Derrida’s aversion to the intervention of the state in forgiveness as wariness of 
the effacement of forgiveness. This dissociation is important because it separates judging 
from forgiving. The implication is that forgiveness is at odds with punishment, which 
Western systems of law associate with justice. However, judgment and forgiveness share the 
characteristics of universality and political applicability.
Derrida poses forgiveness only in the context of a singular perpetrator, explaining 
what it would look like s’il y en a, “if there is such a thing,” in a 2002 roundtable discussion 
following a seminar on forgiveness.219 Forgiveness can only be between two people on their 
own terms. He cites the example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
to show that the state cannot forgive on behalf of the victim.220 Forgiveness is the sole decision 
of the victim, and the offender must retain his or her identity as an offender while the victim 
retains his or her victimhood. 
The only instance, then, in which Derrida’s pure forgiveness could play out among 
actual people is an imaginary scenario in which a victim repeatedly forgives an offender as the 
offender continues to harm the victim, thus maintaining the status of each individual as victim 
and offender. This hypothetical describes forgiveness only if the offender, repeatedly offending, 
remains an offender and the victim, repeatedly victimized, remains a victim while forgiving. 
The moment the victim stops seeing the offender as an offender, there is no longer an offender 
to forgive. 
This puzzle of forgiveness offers many immediately obvious but shallow points of 
critique. For example, there is the concern that the above scenario echoes cycles of domestic 
abuse and could be critiqued from a feminist angle, the argument that forgiveness as a 
deconstructive concept transcends all philosophical categories, and the critique of pure 
217   Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman. “Derrida.” USA: Jane Doe Films, 2002.
218   Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 59. 
219   Kearney.
220   Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 43. 
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forgiveness as an inhuman act.221 Moreover, part of Derrida’s argument against the universality 
of forgiveness is a practical concern: if everyone forgave every offense, “there would no longer 
be an innocent person on earth—and therefore no one in the position to judge or arbitrate.”222 
The pure forgiveness model as an aporia is consistent with the deconstructive 
attempt to break down dualities and show ideas enclosing both their possibility and their 
impossibility. Derrida’s forgiveness (both in his theoretical explanation in On Cosmpolitanism 
and Forgiveness and in his imaginary scenario from the roundtable discussion) exemplifies the 
deconstruction of a concept. Moreover, he resists the effacement of the idea of forgiveness, 
which is consistent with his work on metaphor. Deconstruction is based on a series of 
contradictions, so pointing out contradictions as flaws in the puzzle of forgiveness is a limited 
strategy. However, a critique of forgiveness in relation to Derrida’s liberal praise of Nelson 
Mandela reveals important tensions. A consideration of this aporia in contrast to his political 
engagement in the Mandela piece, discussed below, offers new routes of critique and new 
usesxforxhisxdeconstructionxofxforgiveness.
Counterexample: Rwandan Forgiveness
Seemingly impossible pure forgiveness resonates with instances of forgiveness in 
postgenocide Rwanda. Survivors there have achieved something resembling Derridian 
forgiveness—forgiveness of seemingly unforgivable crimes, with the necessity to forgive anew 
over and over. The genocide in 1994 involved neighbors killing neighbors, resulting in one 
million deaths in one hundred days. The reintegration of perpetrators into their communities 
alongside the survivors whose families they killed creates a unique political-historical context 
for forgiveness as a necessity for daily life to continue. Women in the countryside near the city 
of Butare have formed a farming cooperative with the men who killed their husbands, forgiving 
the unforgivable every time they interact with the perpetrators in daily life. This example shows 
that while Derrida’s concept of pure forgiveness resonates with the impossibility/possibility 
dynamic of forgiveness in Rwanda, Derrida’s refusal to allow political or social outcomes for 
forgiveness is a flaw in his theory. 
Forgiveness versus Mandela Piece: Economic Exchange
In On Forgiveness, Derrida explicitly resists the use of pure forgiveness for political 
purposes. Explaining what he sees as the danger of overusing forgiveness, he writes, 
If I am conscious that I forgive, then I not only recognize myself but I thank 
myself, or I am waiting for the other to thank me, which is already the 
reinscription of forgiveness into an economy of exchange and hence the 
annihilation of forgiveness.223
Pure forgiveness must not be “contaminated by political agendas,”224 an idea that stands in stark 
contrast to his earlier veneration of Mandela’s use of the ideal of justice in politics.
221   Mary-Jane Rubenstein, “Of Ghosts and Angels: Derrida, Kushner, and the Impossibility of Forgiveness,” Journal for 
Cultural and Religious Theory 9.1 (2008): 84.
222   Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 27. 
223   Kearney 53. 
224   Suzanne Guerlac, “The Fragility of the Pardon (Derrida and Riceur),” Derrida and the Time of the Political, eds. Suzanne 
Guerlac and Pheng Cheah (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2009)  258.
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Derrida’s moral and extralegal concept of justice in a contribution to a 1987 volume about 
the imprisoned Nelson Mandela points to a tension within his philosophy of political justice versus 
abstract forgiveness. This essay admires Mandela for his “admiration of Mandela, a double genitive: 
the one he inspires and the one he feels … he becomes admirable for having, with all his force, 
admired, and for having made a force of his admiration.”225 Although Derrida later deconstructs 
democracy as thus both self-improving (constantly aspiring to be more democratic, exhibiting 
“perfectibility”) and self-destructing (providing weapons for its own destruction, as in the case 
of September 11th),226 in the Mandela piece he is fairly uncritical of the democratic ideal and the 
universal moral concept Mandela invokes. He admires Mandela for admiring “law itself, the law 
above other laws” and the English system of parliamentary democracy, separation of powers, and 
human rights.227 He finds universal potential in a teleological democratic ideal, represented by the 
“seed,” or the “filling out” of the democratic form.228 He praises Mandela for fighting apartheid from 
within the apartheid government’s constitutional framework and for calling upon a higher ideal of 
law based on the Rousseauian general will of the whole nation, black and white. 
Despite his previous critique of teleological philosophy and metaphysics from Aristotle 
to Heidegger, in the Mandela essay Derrida traces Mandela’s understanding of law from 
Rousseau’s “general will” to Kant’s categorical imperative and Socrates’ primacy of a higher 
law of conscience over man-made laws.229 However, by following this route of deconstructive 
critique to support Mandela’s universal ideals of justice and equality, Derrida is ignoring his 
own resistance elsewhere to the entry of such universals into the political sphere.  
It is not that Derrida forgets his deconstructive roots when he turns to Mandela; on 
the contrary, he deconstructs both Mandela’s admiration (admiring Mandela and admiring 
Mandela’s admiration) and the historical moment (Mandela’s reflective view toward the unjust 
apartheid law showing the law its own illegality).230 Rather, it is Mandela’s ideas and his use 
of them that Derrida fails to deconstruct. Derrida (almost uncritically) traces the historical 
narrative of Mandela’s application of a universal ideal to politics, itself an example of what 
Derrida usually would deride as effacement of the idea. The Mandela essay presents a liberal 
idea of justice (echoing Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.) that emphasizes respect for the 
individual and a higher morality that transcends current laws. 
Despite this earlier endorsement of universal democratic ideals in political discourses, 
in the forgiveness essay Derrida opposes the universal of forgiveness being implemented in 
the postconflict politics of South Africa. Citing an example of a female apartheid victim who 
during her Truth and Reconciliation Commission testimony resists Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s 
language of forgiveness, Derrida argues against the use of forgiveness in postconflict politics, 
saying that pure forgiveness must happen between two people:
One day a woman comes to testify before the Commission. Her husband had 
been assassinated by torturers who were police officers…. “A commission or a 
225   Jacques Derrida, “The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration,” trans. Mary Ann Caws and Isabelle Lorenz, 
For Nelson Mandela, eds. Jacques Derrida and Mustapha Tlili (New York: Seaver Books, 1987) 15. 
226   Cheah and Guerlac 13
227   Derrida, “The Laws of Reflection,” 15. 
228   Derrida, “The Laws of Reflection,” 25.
229   Derrida, “The Laws of Reflection,” 27–28.
230   Guerlac 264.
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government cannot forgive. Only I, eventually, could do it. (And I am not ready 
to forgive.)”… the anonymous body of the State or of a public institution cannot 
forgive. It has neither the right nor the power to do so; and besides, that would 
have no meaning.231 
This example of Derrida’s resistance to the use of forgiveness in politics contrasts directly with 
his admiration for Mandela’s political use of the idea of justice.
After a 1998 lecture at the University of Western Cape, a young South African woman 
asked Derrida, 
You might have made that idea of pure forgiveness with a lot of irony…. But 
we [the white post-apartheid student audience] sit here as potential objects of 
forgiveness, and we are all of us, including you, in a sense, guilty. Don’t you 
think it fulfills an ideological function telling us we should not repent, not ask 
for forgiveness, because then we ruin pure, unconditional forgiveness, when 
at the same time you are telling oppressed people they should forgive without 
expecting forgiveness? 
In response, Derrida drew a dividing line between pure forgiveness and reconciliation 
in South Africa, voicing a concern that bringing forgiveness into the political process of 
reconciliation would Christianize the latter.232 This response exemplifies the very resistance to 
the economization of a concept of which he is guilty in the Mandela essay. In contrast to his 
endorsement of universal standards of justice, Derrida relegates forgiveness to hypotheticals 
and thought experiments.
Derrida insists that he has nothing against reconciliation, which he sees as an economic 
transaction that is not equivalent to forgiveness and that can be politically beneficial in many 
postconflict situations:
“Healing away” is a major term in South Africa…. But if the word forgiveness 
is used in a view of such an ecology or therapy I would say no, that is not to 
forgive. It is perhaps very useful, a very noble strategy, but it is not forgiveness…. 
I am trying—and I know how violent this is—to disassociate true forgiveness 
from all these finalities—of reconciliation, salvation, redemption, and so on.233 
This terminological slight of hand conveniently obscures Derrida’s failure to do anything 
more with “true forgiveness” than describe its impossible hypothetical scenario. The moment 
the question of pure forgiveness is raised in the wake of unforgivable crimes, Derrida shies 
away from its application and turns to reconciliation instead. However, both the South African 
and the Rwandan examples show the possibility of forgiveness having political and social 
consequences for reconciliation. Even considering the valid concerns about the theatrical nature 
of forgiveness in the South African public eye, in both Rwanda and South Africa, Derridian 
forgiveness between perpetrators and survivors has contributed to the healing of society. The 
caution Derrida exhibits toward the use of forgiveness in politics can temper a policy- or results-
driven approach. 
231   Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 43.
232   Dick and Ziering Kofman.
233   Kearney 56.
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Instead of urging postconflict regimes to attempt to legislate forgiveness, this article 
(with an eye toward Derrida’s apprehension about effacement) aims to parse through Derrida’s 
vacillation about the application of pure forgiveness. Derrida’s attempt to turn moral ideals 
inside out, and to posit only very specific instances in which pure forgiveness is possible, 
reveals not only an internal theoretical weakness but also a political one. This article reveals 
new discourses of transitional justice that facilitate or consider forgiveness, rather than 
mandate or enforce it or try to incorporate it into state procedures. While Derrida’s wariness 
about forgiveness being corrupted by political exposure can offer valuable caution against the 
mutation of forgiveness for political ends, it does not mean that forgiveness has no potential 
power for politics.  Rather, Derrida’s inconsistency between the Mandela case and “On 
Forgiveness” allows for a new way of thinking about postconflict forgiveness that has political 
impact (such as reconciliation between groups, or stability and peace) without itself being 
implicitly political or corrupted by politics.
Derrida’s answer to the problem of using forgiveness after violence is reconciliation, 
which he sees as a more feasible alternative to forgiveness generations removed from the 
conflict.234 Forgiveness remains impossible, but reconciliation becomes an easier option. 
However, the incongruence between this answer and the Mandela piece provides an opening 
for an application of Derrida’s theory of forgiveness that is contrary to Derrida’s own 
restrictions for the theory. Moreover, as South Africa and Rwanda show, reconciliation can be 
enabled by or occur simultaneously with forgiveness while remaining a separate concept. 
When Derrida turns to politics and attempts to apply the deconstructive concept to 
current events, he cheapens his own claim to deconstructive purity, exemplifying the usury 
or effacement of concepts he so fears. In his praise of Mandela’s use of the universal ideals of 
justice, freedom, and equality, Derrida loses his critical view of philosophical concepts being 
used and abused in politics. 
Ideas of universal rights and crimes against humanity—the ultimate justification 
for the Nuremburg Trials, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—emerged from mass violence. If these ideas are 
based on the sacredness of the Abrahamic man, then they represent the large-scale “theatrical 
space” of a “virtually Christian convulsion-conversion-confession”235 that Derrida criticizes 
for globalizing to non-Christian areas of the world. This is his main grievance with the 
government’s employment of the language of forgiveness in the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and in international political negotiations.236 The African National 
Congress’s history of reconciliation politics and language of post-apartheid forgiveness, as well 
as forgiveness in Rwanda, throws this internal contradiction within Derrida’s philosophical 
endeavor into even starker relief. Thus, the internal contradictions between Derrida’s work on 
South Africa and his theory of pure forgiveness, as well as the external example of Rwandan 
forgiveness, point to the possibility of Derridian forgiveness having political and social 
significance.
234   Michal Ben-Naftali, “An Interview with Professor Jacques Derrida,” trans. Moshe Ron (Jerusalem: Shoah Resource Center,  
         8 Jan. 1998) 7.
235   Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 31.
236   Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 29.
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The external examples of Rwandan postgenocide forgiveness and Mandela’s political 
idealism serve to amplify the internal vacillations in Derrida’s theory between his work 
on forgiveness and his use of Nelson Mandela and their implications for opening up pure 
forgiveness to have political and social import. It is crucial to engage with Derrida’s aporia of 
pure forgiveness on his own terms before integrating it into a political theory of forgiveness. 
The moment of tension in the theory between Derrida’s pure forgiveness and his idealistic 
writing on Nelson Mandela allows for the Rwandan case to exemplify the possibility that pure 
forgiveness can have a political impact on reconciliation after mass violence.
Conclusion 
I accept Derrida’s concept of pure forgiveness as an isolated philosophical ideal 
within his deconstructive framework. However, the tension between the Mandela essay and 
pure forgiveness weakens Derrida’s deconstructive purity: the theory attempts to straddle 
a simultaneous theoretical isolation and political engagement. Where these two impulses 
are at odds, they point to possibilities for new approaches to forgiveness through Derrida’s 
philosophy. The discrepancy between political-ethical discourse and deconstructive critique not 
only cheapens the pure forgiveness model but also insufficiently approaches political problems, 
doing injustice to both deconstructive theory and political solutions. The opening the theoretical 
vacillation gives for political import allows the example of Derridian forgiveness in Rwanda to 
challenge Derrida’s separation of pure forgiveness from solutions for postconflict reconciliation.
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